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Abstract: 
Using the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as a case study, this 
paper asks: firstly, to what extent is the use of digital communications 
technologies (DCTs), in particular social media, associated with 
fundamental changes to campaign organisations, specifically to the 
command and control model? Secondly, under what conditions are 
challenges to the model more likely to emerge?  
Using mixed methods, our analysis of the case demonstrates that radical 
organisational or strategic change is not inevitable, nor is there a one-size-
fits-all approach. Technologies are not ‘just tools’ that any campaign with 
enough resources will adopt in similar ways. Instead, depending on a 
number of interdependent factors (i.e. context, resources, strategy, 
organisational structure and culture), some campaigns—like Better 
Together—selectively adopt digital tools that fit with the command and 
control model; in other cases—like Yes Scotland—the application of DCTs 
and the dynamics created by linking to other (digital-enabled) grassroots 
organisations can have transformative effects. 
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Ana Ines Langer, Michael Comerford and Des McNulty 
Abstract 
Using the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as a case study, this paper asks: 
firstly, to what extent is the use of digital communications technologies (DCTs), in 
particular social media, associated with fundamental changes to campaign 
organisations, specifically to the command and control model? Secondly, under 
what conditions are challenges to th  model more likely to emerge?  
Using mixed methods, our analysis of the case demonstrates that radical 
organisational or strategic change is not inevitable, nor is there a one-size-fits-all 
approach. Technologies are not ‘just tools’ that any campaign with enough 
resources will adopt in similar ways. Instead, depending on a number of 
interdependent factors (i.e. context, resources, strategy, organisational structure and 
culture), some campaigns—like Better Together—selectively adopt digital tools 
that fit with the command and control model; in other cases—like Yes Scotland—
the application of DCTs and the dynamics created by linking to other (digital-
enabled) grassroots organisations can have transformative effects. 
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Ever since digital communication technologies (DCTs) became widely 
available, they have raised great expectations for not only their democratizing 
potential against authoritarian regimes but also the bread and butter of democracy: 
electoral campaigns. They have raised hopes of information abundance, better 
conditions for deliberation, and greater and more inclusive grassroots participation. 
Lately, social media and its networked peer-to-peer interactivity have added to the 
enthusiasm, potentially opening the door for individuals and groups to participate 
in ways that are neither controlled by conventional media gatekeepers nor by 
official campaign organisations. On the other hand, there are acute concerns about 
information overload, echo chambers, ‘fake news’ and incivility, the reinforcement 
of existing power inequalities and digital rocket fuel being provided for 
exclusionary populist actors. As the academic debate matured, it has become 
clearer that technology per se does not cause change. As our study demonstrates, 
technologies are not ‘just tools’; instead, technological affordances are leveraged, 
to different degrees and in different ways, by actors in context, thus providing 
differential constraints and opportunities to campaigns. Change is taking place, but 
it is not inevitable or uniform. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to how actors 
differently adopt, and adapt to, technology (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016; 
Earl & Kimport, 2011; Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006).  
Thus, and given that the use of DTCs is now a mainstay of electioneering 
we must ask not if, but how and why they are used the way they are by competing 
campaign organisations, and with what impact on power dynamics. This paper uses 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as a case study to answer the following 
question: to what extent is the use of digital tools, and particularly social media, 
associated with fundamental changes in the nature and practices of electoral 
Page 2 of 42
Political Studies
Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Online Allies and Tricky Freelancers   3 
 
 
 
campaign organisations? More precisely, are electoral campaign organisations 
changing from the traditional professional model, focused on command and 
control, towards a more hybrid model that blends this with greater bottom-up, 
decentralised participation from a range of loosely connected non-elite actors, as is 
more typically associated with some social movements? Secondly, under what 
conditions are these different models more likely to emerge? 
We were particularly interested in how in 2014 the two opposing campaigns 
navigated the tensions between using technology to foster enthusiasm and 
participation, while maintaining control of their key messages and resources, and 
how this relates to the context, to the respective campaign strategies, and to their 
organizational structure and culture. The focus is on use of social media by the 
campaigns but in the context of their broader use of DCTs—from blogs to email, to 
SMS, crowd-sourcing sites and membership management systems—and the hybrid 
media system (Chadwick, 2013) 
Despite the massive interest in all-things-internet, research of this kind is 
relatively scarce, especially outside the US. Moreover, most research has studied 
primaries or general election campaigns, notably Howard Dean’s and Barack 
Obama’s (e.g. Bimber, 2014; Kreiss, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014). In contrast, the 
organisational impact of the use of DCTs during referendum campaigns has seldom 
been explored. However, as this paper shows, referenda provide rich research 
territory; as in the Scottish case, they are inherently interesting hybrids, in that they 
combine characteristics of general election campaigns with those of advocacy 
campaigns. 
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On the one hand, the campaigns were not party- or candidate-centred but 
short-term coalitions. On the other, the main parties—and to some extent 
governments (UK and Scottish)—were at the core of both campaigns, and both 
coalitions relied on the parties’ organisational resources and campaign expertise, as 
well as some of their best-known figures. At the same time, political parties on both 
sides were obliged to campaign alongside other parties with whom they are 
normally in competition. On the No side (Better Together), differences in policy 
and political values between Labour and the Conservatives made them uneasy bed-
fellows and affected the level of enthusiasm amongst party members and supporters 
for joint activity. On the pro-independence side (Yes Scotland), the SNP and its 
supporters appeared more willing to work with other parties and a number of 
vibrant grassroots advocacy organisations, in pursuit of the common goal of 
independence. These complex and varied interactions between the official 
campaigns, established parties and many highly-engaged grassroots groups of 
different kinds contributed to set different constraints and opportunities for each 
campaign for the use of DCTs and makes this case especially interesting. 
At the same time, the referendum had much in common with key features of 
many contemporary general election campaigns. Processes of political re-alignment 
and the weakening of traditional partisan affiliations in many Western democracies 
have been accompanied by the eruption in number and importance of vibrant 
digitally-enabled grassroots groups, such as Indignados in Spain, Momentum in the 
UK and Occupy in the USA. These groups are increasingly playing key roles 
alongside (and often within) established parties in which, with ‘multi-speed 
memberships’(Scarrow, 2014), boundaries between insiders and outsiders are 
becoming increasingly fluid. This makes the case of the Scottish independence 
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relevant not only to referenda, which are increasingly important, but also to 
electoral campaigns more generally. 
The distinctiveness of our study resides not only in the characteristics of its 
subject—the referendum—but also our mixed methodology, which combines the 
use of computational techniques to analyse the differences in the pattern of Twitter 
activity between the two campaigns and key groups, and in-depth interviews with 
key campaign stakeholders. This provides a rich and innovative empirical analysis 
of how and why DCTs—and especially social media—are used by, and affect, 
competing campaigns.  
The paper will first discuss the impact of DCTs on parties and campaign 
organisations, with emphasis on the concept of organizational hybridity. The 
second section explains our methodology. The final sections focus on the analysis 
first of the Twitter data and then of the interviews. We conclude by highlighting the 
significance of our findings for the study of electoral campaigns and the impact of 
social media, and DCTs more broadly, in politics.  
 
Electioneering and DCTs: change and continuity 
Since the 1980s, political communication research has analysed changing 
models of campaigning and how these have been greatly influenced—and for some 
driven—by technological developments. Election campaigns in the modern or 
‘third era of political communication’ have been characterized by a heavy focus on 
mediated communication (especially TV), professionalization, tightly centralized 
control of campaign messages, emphasis on targeting of undecided voters aided by 
public opinion research, and escalating costs (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Norris, 
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Curtice, Sanders, Scammell, & Semetko, 1999; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). This is 
accompanied by a ‘top-down’ centralized command and control organization, 
emphasizing agenda setting, staying ‘on message’, and rapid rebuttal. In this model 
most citizens have a limited role as spectators, and those party supporters who 
continue to actively engage are tightly managed by the professional campaign 
hierarchy.  
This model has continued to evolve alongside developments in technology 
and data science into the so-called ‘post-modern’ era (Norris et al., 1999). On the 
one hand, digital tools have enabled even more sophisticated message discipline, 
micro-targeting and use of data (Kreiss 2016), while on the other hand, technology 
has contributed to the creation of a fragmented, high speed and rapidly changing 
communication environment (Chadwick, 2013). These challenges are played out 
against a background of widespread concern at crises of participation, especially 
disengagement from traditional political parties and decreasing turnout (Van 
Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012).   
In this context, DCTs offer great opportunities for campaign organisations 
but, equally, they present challenges to the traditional model of professional 
command and control. Because of their technological affordances, DCTs—and 
most especially social media—offer the possibility of greater and more diverse 
forms of participation, more easily and with greater two-way interaction with, as 
well as autonomy from, the campaign. However, the practice is less simple: 
technological affordances do not automatically translate into change, still less 
democratizing change. Moreover, they are adopted and adapted by campaigns in 
different ways. Research has shown that DCTs are most often used by campaigns 
to instrumentally harness citizens’ enthusiasm and labour, using data-assisted 
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guidance (Vaccari, 2010) or ‘computational management’ (Kreiss, 2012) to manage 
participation, with the emphasis on ‘controlled interactivity’ (Stromer-Galley, 
2014). Supporters become message multipliers and even ‘brand advocates’, but 
generally have little input over policy or strategy. Thus, much research has argued 
that DCT use often falls well short of the higher ideals of deliberative and 
participatory democracy, even if they have some success at mobilization (Howard, 
2006; Stromer-Galley, 2014). On the other hand, the more optimistic accounts of 
DCTs and citizenship have stressed their potential to fit with ‘actualizing’ (Bennett, 
Wells, & Freelon, 2011) or ‘engaged’ (Dalton, 2008) modes of participation, 
although more for civic than party organisations (Wells, 2015).  
Ultimately, as Chadwick and Stromer-Galley argue, the degree and kind of 
participation associated with digital tools depends upon how they ‘are assembled 
and organizationally enacted’ (2016, p. 285). But how is this manifested in practice 
and how can it be explained? In other words, how do different campaign 
organisations react to these possibilities and challenges and which factors help to 
explain why they do so? 
A large body of literature has demonstrated the impact of changes 
associated with the digital revolution on policy-advocacy arenas and especially 
social movements (e.g. Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 
2005; Chadwick & Dennis, 2017; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Karpf, 2012). Research 
about the impact on electoral campaign organisations is less common but it is clear 
nonetheless that the adoption of digital tools is now commonplace and that they are 
used in a range of both back-end and public-facing functions (Kreiss, 2012; 
Lilleker & Jackson, 2011; Nielsen, 2012; Vaccari, 2010). Much of the election 
campaign research has focused on testing the normalization vs. equalization 
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hypotheses (see Gibson & McAllister, 2015) and thus on the effects of party size, 
funding and incumbency. However, aside of the impact of resources, less is known 
about how and why campaign organisations differentially adopt and adapt to the 
use of DTCs, and the ‘micro-incentives’ (Vaccari 2010) and constraints for doing 
so. Moreover, existing studies have tended to focus on analysis of content such as 
websites or tweets (e.g. Gibson, 2015; Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014; 
Lilleker & Jackson, 2011), while research incorporating the input from campaign 
actors themselves is rare (for some insightful exceptions see Baldwin-Philippi, 
2015; Kreiss, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014; Vaccari, 2010), as is that 
integrating the analysis of the role of actors outside the official campaigns. This 
paucity is especially marked outside the US, which both technologically and 
institutionally is a rather exceptional case (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008; Bimber, 
2014). 
It is clear, however, that it cannot be assumed that the use of DCTs leads to 
far-reaching nor one size-fits-all changes to the command and control model of 
campaigning. There are thus two key arguments at the cor  of our analysis. Firstly, 
it is not just a matter of access to technology; how it is used, and thus the 
challenges to the command and control model, are conditional to a number of other 
inter-dependent factors. Secondly, change results on hybridity rather than replacing 
the ‘old’ with the ‘new’. The beauty of the concept of hybridity it is that it avoids 
unhelpful dichotomies, and leads us to ‘“not only, but also” patterns of thought 
(Chadwick, 2013). A hybrid campaign organization is one where there is a blend of 
organizational structures and strategies found in electoral politics with 
characteristics more typically associated with some social movements, especially 
digitally networked ones with ‘post-bureaucratic’ characteristics that emerged in 
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the late 1990s and 2000s. Drawing specially on Chadwick (2007, 2013), Flanagin 
et al. (2006), Kreiss (2009), and Vaccari (2010), we understand the concept in two 
dimensions. Firstly, it is about how campaigns engage with citizens, especially 
individual supporters and volunteers as well as groups, and hence how they 
construct citizenship (Baldwin-Philippi, 2015; Wells, 2015). Secondly, it refers to 
the organizational arrangements that enable this and also enhance it, in a two-way 
dynamic between modes of engagement and organizational structure.  
Below we schematically summarise the main dimensions that characterize 
traditional electoral and networked movement-like organisations. There is a degree 
of overlap between some categories but each pair emphasises a different 
dimension. Moreover, these categories are a matter of degree with most campaigns 
falling somewhere along the continuum, and movement from one type to the other 
is as an adaption that represents a shift along the spectrum, rather than replacement 
of one type of organization with another.   
Traditional electoral organisations                 Networked movement-like organisations 
Elites/campaign professionals Greater/more diverse grassroot 
participation 
Top down/one-to-many/broadcasting Bottom-up/many-to-many/interactive/co-
production and peer-sharing  
Management Empowerment and self-expression  
Structure/coordination/control Spontaneity/self-initiative/autonomy 
Hierarchical and bureaucratized 
organization 
Loosely connected individuals and groups 
Centripetal/centralized Centrifugal/decentralized  
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According to US research, the most successful electoral campaigns 
increasingly combine elements of both types, albeit to different extents (Bimber, 
2014; Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2009, 2012; Vaccari, 2010). Moreover, how much 
and how they do so is mediated by the interplay of a number of factors. We will 
demonstrate that in addition to resources, which as explained above has been the 
focus of much of the previous research, one must consider contextual, strategic, 
organisational and cultural factors. Furthermore, our research contributes towards 
understanding how these processes work outside the US—where previous research 
has focused—and how specifically they work in the context of a heated 
constitutional referendum.  
Thus, drawing on the analytical framework above, we analyse to what 
extent, how and why the two campaigns in the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum blended the two types of organization and practices in their use of 
DCTs, focusing on social media. As with any single case study, we are not able to 
generalise. Nonetheless, we offer a detailed exploration that enables us to better 
understand the dynamics at play and the range of factors involved. Before we 
proceed to our analysis, the next section explains our methodology.  
 
Methodology 
We employed a mixed methods approach: in-depth interviews alongside a 
network analysis of posts in the social media platform Twitter
2
. The focus is not on 
the content of the tweets, nor on the use of Twitter specifically; instead we analyse 
Twitter data to provide a window into the characteristics of the two campaigns and 
their wider network of relations (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011, p. 201). This 
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‘window’ has its limitations and provides only one way of examining the 
campaigns’ structure and strategies, which might be different to we might learn 
from other platforms, given differences in affordances, norms and reach (Gerbaudo, 
2012; Kreiss, Lawrence, & McGregor, 2018); nonetheless, it is highly insightful in 
combination with the interview data.  
We collected tweets using the public search application programming 
interface (API)
3
. This was queried three times per day for the hashtag '#indyref' 
between January and September 2014
4
. This method provided over 2.8M tweets, 
drawn from c.146,000 unique user accounts. To construct the dataset for network 
analysis, we extracted user interactions, i.e. ‘retweets’, ‘@mentions’, and 
‘@replies’. These interactions (c.1.4M) provided the nodes (the Twitter user 
accounts) and edges (interactions betwe n two users) for the network analysis
5
.  
We subsequently conducted twelve in-depth interviews asking how and 
why the two sides in the referendum used social media and DCTs more generally, 
and how this connected to strategies, actors and context. The rich insights from the 
interviews enabled us to ‘reconstruct the operating philosophies of elite political 
actors’ (Vaccari, 2010, p. 335), exploring how and why they believe they used 
technology as they did, while the analysis of the twitter networks helps reveal some 
of the ways that the campaigns and other actors actually used it. The interviewees 
were four key staffers from each of the official campaigns, and three leading 
members of groups that were highly active in the digital sphere during the 
referendum but were not, at least formally, part of the umbrella organisations. In 
addition, we interviewed one journalist focused on digital issues, who was 
mentioned several times in the interviews as someone with useful insights into both 
campaigns. From the official campaigns, we selected those responsible for leading 
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on digital, but included also the managers they reported to and key staff working in 
other aspects of the campaign, such as message or community. The second group of 
interviewees were from unofficial pro-independence groups. The imbalance 
between Yes and No reflected the heavy preponderance of groups on the Yes side 
in the digital conversation about the referendum. The interviews were semi-
structured and were conducted between November 2014 and March 2015. On 
average they were an hour long, mostly conducted face-to-face, and recorded and 
later transcribed. They were then thematically analysed following the framework 
on Table 1 (above). As agreed in our ethics consent procedures, quotes from the 
interviews have been anonymized.  
 
Analysis 
Twitter networks and the characteristics of the campaigns  
In this section we analyse Twitter data from the key period of the 
referendum campaign: January to September 2014. By comparing data for the Yes 
and No campaigns, we are able to show how their use of a key social media 
platform played out in practice, in particular in relation to key groups in the 
assemblage. Previous research has shown that Yes Scotland was overall more 
successful in terms of number of friends, followers and engagement both in 
Facebook and Twitter (Shepard & Quinlan, 2016). Our macro analysis based on 
measures of centrality in Figure 1 also shows that the Yes side dominated the 
conversation in Twitter: the blue nodes coded as Yes were more central, and 
heavily outweigh the red No-aligned nodes
6
.  
Figure 1  
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In line with our research question, the objective is not to delve into markers 
of success. Instead, our focus of analysis is on the networks, and specifically on the 
ways in which different nodes interacted with each other and what this tell us about 
levels of centralization and autonomy of the official campaigns vis-à-vis key 
groups in their assemblages. 
To uncover the general characteristics of the official Yes and No overall 
networks, we identified all the Twitter accounts that the official campaigns 
interacted with, i.e. by retweeting them or mentioning them directly, which is 
known as their outbound ego-network
7
. The first striking difference is numerical, 
suggesting a different degree of engagement and inclusiveness: 291 vs. 160 nodes 
(or accounts) for Yes and No respectively. Secondly, there are significant variations 
in prevalence of different types of actors. For Better Together, of the 10 accounts 
they most often retweeted or mentioned, only three belonged to supporter groups, 
while six were accounts of leading members of the campaigns, and one a media 
outlet. In contrast, for Yes Scotland, seven out of the top 10 belonged to supporter 
groups. Furthermore, all top five accounts were supporter groups for Yes Scotland, 
whereas only one of the top five for Better Together was a supporter group. 
To further explore these differences, in Figures 2 and 3 we specifically 
visualize the connection between the official campaign accounts and the accounts 
of key groups aligned with them
8
. Given our aims, and that only a small fraction of 
the findings can be visualised in detail, we selected a subset of accounts from their 
ego-networks. The selection criteria for the visualisation were as follows: the 
accounts had to have a reciprocal relationship in Twitter with the official campaign; 
they had to support the official campaigns side of the debate; they had to be 
organisations or websites that identified as a collective, rather than individual 
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political actors (e.g. politicians, journalists, etc.); and they had to hold some 
importance in the network. We quantify importance here using three criteria: their 
betweenness centrality, the frequency of interactions with the official campaigns 
and their own level of out-bound activity. Finally, only groups that were not 
directly controlled by Yes Scotland/Better Together were included, i.e. groups that 
the official campaigns either created, or whose communications they exerted 
significant control over (e.g. sectoral groups such as Academics for Yes, NHS 
Together), are excluded. 
 
Figures 2 and 3  
These visualizations consist of a circular node representing each Twitter 
user account, where the size of the node represents the number of connections that 
account has
9
. The connecting lines between accounts are representative of the 
amount of activity (represented by the thickness of the line) and the source of that 
activity (colour of the line
10
). For example, in Figure 3 we can see the strong 
connection between National Collective and Yes Scotland, represented by the thick 
blue line that indicates a large volume of traffic (i.e. retweets or mentions) from 
National Collective (@wearenational, the source) directed at Yes Scotland (the 
target). To the lower right of the National Collective node a smaller red edge can be 
observed representing the traffic that passes from Yes Scotland to National 
Collective.   
Overall, the analysis suggests that Yes Scotland’s twitter engagement with 
key groups is more hybrid, i.e. less centralized, and combining autonomy and 
control, a blend that is essentially absent for Better Together. The key difference is 
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that in Figure 2 there is a lack of interconnections between the No-aligned 
accounts, in a way that most closely resembles the hub-and-spoke or star structure 
associated with centrally managed hierarchical networks (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2013). In contrast, although the Yes subnet in Figure 3 also has a dominant official 
campaign node at its centre, the breadth of interconnections and levels of activity 
between intermediate nodes shows a higher degree of decentralization. 
Regarding differences in the degree of autonomy, Figure 3 also shows that a 
number of Yes-aligned accounts were at times creating more output on Twitter than 
the official campaign; National Collective is the most active of these accounts. 
There is also an indication that a different pattern of engagement is taking place. In 
a heavily centralized campaign we would expect traffic to largely use the official 
campaign as a conduit in order to communicate with other parts of the network; 
however, there are multiple interactions happening between the intermediate group 
nodes. For example, the patterns of traffic between the Radical Independence 
Campaign (RIC) (@radical_indy) and other nodes such as Women for 
Independence (@womenforindy) and Bella Caledonia (@bellacaledonia), contrast 
with the low traffic between RIC and Yes Scotland. On the No side, the 
predominant pattern is linear, corresponding to a broadcast model where 
information is relayed downwards. On the Yes side, the pattern of transmission is 
more complex with multiple interactions, and a key role for the grassroots groups. 
This is also supported by Figure 4, which visualizes the connections between Yes 
Scotland and supportive local groups
11
: many groups active on Twitter on the Yes 
side developed their own organic connections, often bypassing the central 
campaign account. Furthermore, the interaction between the pro-independence 
groups is polycentric in character, and shows a much greater number of twitter-
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engaged local groups when compared with the No side (not shown here), whose 
network of local groups is sparsely populated and has again a hub and spoke 
structure.  
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge and delineate the limits of 
the official campaign’s openness. The absence of some prominent Yes supporting 
accounts in Figure 3 tells us something important about the attitude of Yes 
Scotland toward different organisations. The most striking example is Wings Over 
Scotland, an influential blog, which is absent from Yes Scotland’s active 
connections. This was discussed in our interviews as a decision taken not to engage 
directly with aspects of the wider Yes campaign regarded as problematic and 
potentially counter-productive to the main message: ‘Wings –we never engaged 
with, ever’ (Interview 5, Yes campaign).   
 
Long Live Command & Control? 
The analysis of the Twitter networks, and especially the relationship 
between the official campaigns and key groups, show revealing differences 
between the two sides. However, this analysis is for us a window into the broader 
characteristics of the official campaigns, their networks and how they used social 
media, and DCTs. The interviews with key campaign staff and associated groups 
are an essential complement to understand continuity and change with the control 
and command model, and especially the reasons for the differences and similarities 
between the campaigns. This is discussed in the next two sections.  
The interviews reveal that digital tools enabled some innovations in their 
campaign practices, but their disruptive impact on the command & control model 
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was limited; instead, there is strong continuity especially, but not only, for Better 
Together. Both official campaigns highlighted the usefulness of a range of DCTs 
on recruiting volunteers, briefing them, and coordinating and monitoring their 
activities, both online and offline. They also referred to their usefulness for 
fundraising, especially for small donations, and to the promise of crowdfunding 
initiatives; but these capabilities were exploited only to a limited extent, in part 
because of UK campaign funding regulation (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008). Social 
media were also regarded as having facilitated new forms of networked peer-to-
peer persuasion and a degree of self-organization among groups on both sides. 
Furthermore, the interviewees explained that the content, form and targets of the 
official campaign messages were influenced to some degree by email and social 
media metrics, especially Facebook’s, which were monitored regularly—although 
in a rather amateur fashion—to calibrate which issues were of greatest interest, by 
whom, and which messages, both in terms of content and presentation, got the most 
positive responses.  
However, there is little evidence from the interviews that the capabilities of 
digital tools, or information obtained from them, were major influences on 
campaign strategy by either side. Firstly, established techniques such as focus 
groups and polling were mentioned as much more important tools in this regard. 
Secondly, the emphasis from both official campaigns was on transmitting 
campaign messages rather than two-way engagement. Attention focused on 
ensuring that there was coherence across media messages and with activities on the 
ground, with campaign managers playing a key role in coordination and 
monitoring.  Moreover, social media, and Twitter in particular, were highlighted as 
a key tool that could be used to try to influence the mainstream media and thus ‘the 
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agenda’. In short, many of the dimensions of the control & command model 
remained in evidence with DCTs bringing new, but not deeply transformative, 
dimensions to it. Crucially, however, there were also significant differences 
between the two campaigns, which were a result of the interplay between 
contextual, strategic, organisational and cultural factors.   
In terms of strategy, the most important difference lay in Better Together’s 
concentration on uncommitted voters as the key to winning the vote. Campaign 
messages were relentlessly aimed at this group, pointing out the risks associated 
with separation, to the extent that the campaign was dubbed (initially by Better 
Together staffers) as ‘Project Fear’. Yes Scotland, while also targeting 
uncommitted voters, gave more weight to addressing and mobilizing their own 
supporters. Crucially, these differences were reflected in, and in turn reinforced by, 
the respective campaigns’ digital strategies.  
Better Together: Top down, On message 
 Despite recruiting the services of Blue State Digital, famously associated 
with the Obama campaigns, Better Together’s digital strategy placed little emphasis 
on self-expression, empowering and mobilizing. Instead, the interviews revealed a 
remarkable accent on control and discipline; the use of ‘we’ firmly restricted to 
campaign professionals at the centre:  
‘We were fairly disciplined in our approach to that…our local groups 
had their own Facebook groups which were largely there to advertise 
local meetings and things like that, and to, sort of, amplify what we 
were doing nationally.  The truth is that in a campaign as heated as 
this was on both sides, people freelancing was a problem, because 
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you had deeply unhelpful things being generated…I think, luckily for 
us, because we were more tightly controlled, let’s…say than the 
other side, you know, there was…whether it was, you know, boycott 
campaigns or attacks on people who were…who had come out in the 
debate.  That, sort of, thousand flowers bloom approach to it caused 
them trouble and actually diluted their message’ (Interview 2, No 
Campaign). 
 
For Better Together social media were used mostly to distribute top-down, 
carefully controlled messages to supporters, the public and especially ‘public 
opinion formers’, including media elites, in line with their overall strategy: 
‘Both Facebook and Twitter were broadcast rather than necessarily 
engagement. Because we didn’t want to dilute the message (…) but 
also we were not building something to last, you know. We always 
were conscious we weren’t going to exist the day after [the vote], so 
we could be more, I guess, mechanical and have a more, kind of, 
instrumental approach’ (Interview 2, No Campaign). 
 
Collective action repertoires—whether digitally enabled or not—were tightly 
managed. Supporters recruited as volunteers via social media were treated as brand 
advocates, restricted to institutional modes of participation where there is ‘little 
initiative, creativity, or control on the part of individuals’ (Flanagin et al., 2006, p. 
37).  Systems were put in place to control any ‘over-enthusiasm’ which Better 
Together campaign managers felt could be wasteful if not directed: ‘they [activists] 
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wanted to leaflet everyone’, rather than restrict themselves to the target groups 
identified by the centre, based on research data and Mosaic groups
12
. This control 
from the centre created tensions with those on the ground, many of whom were 
new to campaign volunteering: ‘for a lot of people that was a big struggle, they 
were getting frustrated’ (Interview 7, No Campaign).  
Only staff could post events to the Better Together website, whereas anyone 
could create and advertise events on the official campaign website for Yes 
Scotland. There were less stringent controls over social media; many pro-Union 
groups were ‘given’ an account and some were allowed to create their own social 
media identities. But campaign managers made it clear that ‘nothing with the Better 
Together brand would be run without a degree of editorial control by staff 
members’ (Interview 2, No Campaign). 
In summary, the use of social media, and DCTs generally, by Better 
Together was not transformative either within the official campaign organization or 
in its relations with supporting groups. There was little openness and 
decentralization or ‘blending’ of the more entrepreneurial participatory modes 
associated with DCTs in cutting-edge contemporary campaigns. This was not a 
result of lack of resources. It was a consequence of the campaign’s strategy, which 
in turn related to the political context, the characteristics of the coalition, and the 
organizational structure and culture that underpinned it. Firstly, and crucially, it 
played to what the interviewees saw as the objectives and strategy of the No 
campaign. It was a short-term coalition with the single objective of winning the 
referendum vote. It avoided ‘emotional messages’ related to identity or other issues 
that could help mobilize but would have exposed differences between the uneasy 
coalition of political parties; instead, they focused on using polling combined with 
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Mosaic data to identify undecided voters concerned about the economic risk of 
independence and then hammered away at this theme. Secondly, Better Together 
was the front runner, until almost the end of the campaign comfortably ahead in the 
polls. Moreover, although campaign managers recognized that Yes was dominating 
social media, they felt they could rely on the support of the press and much of the 
mainstream media. In this context, from an instrumental point of view, it is not 
surprising that control of the message and targeting was regarded as vital, and 
‘freelance’ participation as a liability that they could do without. Thirdly, their use 
of DCTs was associated with a highly centralized structure, which heavily relied on 
the existing expertise, infrast ucture and collective action repertoires from the 
political parties that formed the pro-Union coalition. Thus, Better Together 
operated more like a conventional political party in its media handling and attempts 
to canvass public support. Moreover, the campaign brought together political 
parties that, according to the interviewees, had not yet mastered digital for 
campaigns. Finally, it was underpinned by, and in turn further promoted, an 
organizational structure where ‘Digital’ was subsumed under ‘Broadcasting’, with 
staff across different sections ‘chipping in’ (Interview 2). Moreover, internal staff 
(not the Blue State Digital consultants) were mostly political campaign—rather 
than digital—specialists which meant that they had, in line with traditional party 
campaigns, norms, values and expertise associated with the command and control 
model and thus were less likely to be innovative in their use of DCTs (Baldwin-
Philippi, 2015; Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2014). 
 
Yes Scotland and the key role of ‘online allies’  
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Yes Scotland was more clearly a hybrid organizational type. It had 
elements of a more decentralized structure and some movement-like 
dynamics blended with traditional party campaigning characteristics, 
enabling —or at least not discouraging— more autonomous bottom-up 
participation and entrepreneurial modes of engagement. As with Better 
Together, this was a result of the interplay of contextual, strategic, 
organisational and cultural factors that affected how they used DCTs, which 
in turn reinforced pre-exiting dynamics.   
There are two important contextual factors that shaped Yes Scotland’s 
overall strategy, which in turn affected their use of DCTs: their trailing 
position in the polls and the weak support in the mainstream media. 
Regarding the latter, social media was deemed particularly important as it 
gave Yes Scotland an alternative channel to what they regarded as a hostile 
press and broadcast media. But it was not the only purpose; social media 
communication was also seen as a means of motivating and expanding the 
activist base:  
‘So apart from being the counterbalance to the mainstream media, to 
the anti-independence media if you like, it [social media] was also one 
of the more obvious means through which we could communicate the 
kind of campaign that we wanted to run and begin to create that 
national movement’ (Interview 1, Yes Campaign).  
 
Moreover, considerable emphasis was laid by the Yes campaign on training 
and educating, not just so that activists could relay official messages, but also 
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with an emphasis on self-expression and peer-sharing, encouraging supporters to 
make their own contributions and to develop personalised networks: 
‘We trained a hard core [of volunteers/’ambassadors’] to just be online 
regularly and to help promote our material, but also to train other 
people and to encourage other people to behave in the way we behave.  
And also, the behaviour thing was less important for us than the 
getting people to understand the message and understand where we 
were at that point in the campaign and what to do, and how to produce 
their own content’ (Interview 3, Yes Campaign).  
 
This mobilizing strategy was facilitated and reinforced by several factors, 
which might be overlooked if one focuses exclusively on Yes Scotland position 
as ‘challenger’. Firstly, there is the prominence given to Digital in the official 
campaign organization. Unlike Better Together, it had a dedicated team, with its 
Director—a respected figure in digital publishing—one of the very first hires. 
Moreover, he reported directly to the Chief Executive—who himself came from 
outside the election campaigns field—and was put on an equal footing with the 
other Directors. Secondly, Yes Scotland was able to draw not only on the size 
and enthusiasm of the SNP’s membership, which was also much younger in 
average, but also on its digital expertise and culture: 
 ‘The SNP has actually got a good understanding of how digital works 
and a commitment to it. So these people were pre-prepared (…) that 
was very useful in terms of establishing just a culture of digital as part 
of what we do’ (Interview 3, Yes campaign) 
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At the same time, the interviews highlighted the importance of the fact that this 
was a referendum. Firstly, that there were greater incentives and opportunities to 
innovate outside the party structure and routine election environment:  
The SNP is…even from an organisational level or other social media, it 
is very rigid and very…in a sense, they have to be a lot more, because 
they’re a membership organisation, whereas we were never a 
membership organisation which meant we…you can’t impute 
responsibility for anyone’s actions, although many people tried.  Whereas 
with the SNP, they’re far more often responsible for the actions of 
councillors or anything like that.  So theirs is a very controlled…our 
message was still very controlled.  Our…what we put out in the core 
things we’d put out, they were always the same themes.  But the SNP, 
you don’t know anything unless they tell you. Whereas there was so 
much information and research on…the independence campaign was so 
broad (Interview 5, Yes Scotland) 
Secondly, and crucially, there were important differences on the degree of 
grassroot support each campaign could tap on and how they chose to interact with 
pre-exiting and new groups. In fact, it is in the relationship of each campaign vis-à-
vis other groups that the differences between the Yes and No campaigns are most 
striking (as illustrated in the twitter analysis above). Both campaigns created some 
local and sectoral groups, whereas a number of other were formed independently. 
But there were many more for Yes Scotland (circa 350 vs. 80) and their online 
presence was subject to less control and interference from the official campaign. 
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Most crucially, for Yes Scotland there was a further assemblage of highly vibrant 
grassroots groups and individual bloggers, which they defined as ‘online allies’, 
that were all but absent for Better Together. Some were SNP members and others 
not, but most of them worked in a decentralised and mostly autonomous manner 
from the official campaign: ‘They set up themselves, self-motivated, and our 
engagement with them on social media would mostly be to share their posts or 
retweet a particular, kind of, campaign message or part of their momentum as well’ 
(Interview 5, Yes campaign).   
Moreover, within the Yes campaign hierarchy and amongst the key supporting 
actors, there was a strong emphasis on the importance of reducing dependence on 
the SNP and building a broader inclusive movement, the term being mentioned by 
almost every interviewee from the pro-independence side. And in doing so, 
autonomy and decentralisation were regarded as key values:  
‘Well, it's just an umbrella term [movement] to describe lots of 
disparate groups working for the same goal. It wasn't an organization 
because it wasn't organized, so what else do you call it? […] people 
didn't wait for instructions or permission, they just got on with doing 
whatever they thought needed done’ (Interview 6, Yes supporter group) 
 
For these grassroots groups, social media played an important, and often crucial, 
role although most of them undertook offline activity as well: 
‘So National Collective, for instance, online linked people talking on 
Facebook chat.  It then developed into offline meetings. It then 
developed into organisational structures that then developed into local 
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groups, that then developed into live public events and campaigns.  
Those people would never have been connected or would have been far 
less likely I believe to have been connected.  People would have been 
far less confident about sharing their voice and sharing their thoughts if 
they hadn’t first had that platform of social media to put them together’ 
(Interview 8, Yes supporter group) 
 
And social media were also important in developing relationships between these 
groups and Yes Scotland, enabling the official campaign to benefit—if not directly 
control—from the broader pro-independence assemblage. It meant that different 
groups could develop content for—and indeed by—a range of audiences, and the 
central campaign could choose to ‘leverage’ (Kreiss 2009) these networks and their 
creative and sharable content, by amplifying these messages through their own 
digital channels: 
 ‘I would say that National Collective were a huge part of the effort in 
terms of producing some really, really good content.  They had a lot of 
fun during the campaign and it showed in the material they produced, 
which we were then able to on-share and expose to a really enormous 
audience.  Bella Caledonia as well. We would re-tweet Women for 
Independence, Business Scotland material as well, and Labour for 
Independence’ (Interview 3, Yes Campaign). 
 
Moreover, although the regulations governing the conduct of the referendum 
were the same for both campaigns, they adapted to them differently. Better 
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Together assimilated groups within their own campaign and funding structures, 
ensuring greater control: ‘We took the decision that Academics, Women Together, 
all these groups, we would bring in house, they’d be in our funding, we could then 
work together, but in terms of the work they did it would be independent, it was 
just they were part of Better Together’ (Interview 7, No Campaign).  Yes 
Scotland’s different approach to external groups was in part pragmatic, simply 
because they had limited influence over a number of organisations. But greater 
autonomy was considered acceptable because this wider base was seen to add both 
energy and breadth to the campaign. It fitted with what Yes Scotland defined as 
their strategic objectives, which included developing into a ‘movement’.  
In fact, according to one senior source, ‘we very much had to be not like a 
political party’ (Interview 1, Yes campaign). Being too closely identified with the 
SNP, or more generally with the collective action repertoires of political parties, 
was seen as an impediment to broadening support for independence. Hence Yes 
Scotland’s less hierarchical structure and encouragement—or at least tolerance—of 
‘different centres of activity and creativity’ (Interview 1, Yes campaign). 
Moreover, as direct coordination of organisations outside the funding umbrella was 
not legal, it enabled, and in some ways necessitated, more entrepreneurial (Flanagin 
et al., 2006) modes of engagement. It is thus clear that the role of grassroots groups 
on the pro-independence side, in combination with contextual, strategic, 
organisational and cultural factors, influenced how the affordances of DCTs were 
enacted. In turn, this challenged traditional campaign hierarchies, dragging both 
Yes Scotland and the wider Yes campaign along the spectrum of hybridity, away 
from exclusive reliance on traditional party campaign organisational practices and 
hierarchies. 
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However, we should not exaggerate either the differences between the two 
campaigns nor the impact of the use of DCTs on the command and control model. 
Better Together did take some steps to encourage participation and develop 
supporter groups, even though its key priority was maintaining control over 
message and activity, which was reflected in its digital strategy. For its part, the 
Yes campaign was hardly a hybrid participatory ‘nirvana’. Although the 
independence movement at large had more horizontal and participatory 
characteristics, and these influenced the official campaign, there were tensions, 
especially with the SNP. Not only there was in Yes Scotland a strong continuity 
with the professional model, but the campaign managers remained nervous about 
their inability to control, and specifically about the risks associated with the way 
social media was used by some of its ‘online allies’ and individual supporters.  
Firstly, although DCTs facilitated greater participation, some of that activity 
was regarded as an inefficient use of resources, and on occasions as a distraction 
with potentially damaging repercussions (e.g. protests against ‘BBC bias’). 
Secondly, they feared the central campaign message was sometimes drowned out 
because: “There was so much information [out there and the] independence 
campaign was so broad with Radical Independence [etc.] putting out their own 
ideas so we had to repeat, repeat, repeat, messages in order to make sure that they 
were the ones getting through” (Interview 5, Yes Campaign). Finally, there was 
great frustration with trolling by what became known as the ‘cyberNats’: ‘We 
distanced ourselves from that as much as possible and we issued guidelines, we got 
our supporters to stamp on that behaviour as much as possible. But it did hurt us’ 
(Interview 3, Yes Campaign). 
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At the same time, there was a recognition within the official Yes campaign that 
because of how the affordances of the technology were enacted and the values that 
underpinned this—it was ineffectual to try to achieve full control: ‘you are in a 
canoe on the rapids and you can't stop moving but you can avoid the rocks’ 
(Interview 3, Yes campaign). Trying too hard to enforce control was considered 
potentially ‘enormously counterproductive’ and had the potential to ‘stifle 
initiative’ (Interview 9, Yes campaign).  
The best approach in the Yes campaigners’ view was to develop ‘an ability to 
just try and accept’ that bottom-up autonomous participation, much of it digitally 
enabled, was a key element in generating and sustaining the passion of the pro-
independence campaign. A number of the interviewees also highlighted the 
importance of self-expression, and even enjoyment and fun, something that was 
entirely absent for Better Together. The official campaign did not accept all 
groups—or arguably any groups—as equal partners, but they were prepared to 
relinquish some of their ability to command and control to try to harness the 
creativity, enthusiasm and effort of local and sectoral groups and the ‘online allies’ 
that had sprung up, even where that resulted in the official campaign being 
bypassed and, on occasion, eclipsed.   
 
Implications and conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature on DCTs and electoral campaigns by 
providing a rich empirical analysis of two opposing campaigns, located at different 
points along the spectrum of hybridity, and unpacking some of the factors that help 
to explain the differences. Our research demonstrates firstly that the use of social 
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media—and DCTs more generally—does not necessarily lead to significant change 
to campaign organisations and practices; in fact, overall, the challenges to the 
command and control model were fairly muted. Secondly, the pattern of use is not 
determined by technological affordances or resources, although both of course play 
a role. Use still very much varies across campaigns, even if they have access to 
similar digital tools. In explaining the differences between the two sides, the 
interplay between contextual factors and the strategic choices made by campaign 
managers were highly significant. But so too were the organizational structure, and 
culture and values of key participants within and outside the official campaigns. 
These are factors that have been less emphasised in previous studies on elections, 
although not so in social movement research. As Chadwick (2007, 285) highlights, 
drawing on Tilly, collective action repertories ‘are not simply neutral tools’ to be 
adopted at will: ‘values shape repertoires of collective action, which in turn shape 
the kind of adoption of organizational forms’. The same applies to DCTs; they are 
not “just technologies” that any campaign with enough resources will adopt in 
similar ways. There must be an elective affinity between digital media affordances 
and organisational culture, which mediate how they are enacted and their impact on 
organisational change. The values and repertoires of Better Together, a 
professionally and party-run, electorally-focused coalition with short-term goals, 
were restrictive and led to a controlled but stifling campaign and use of social 
media. This was in contrast to the pro-independence side, an insurgent campaign 
run by a mix of party and non-party experts and that—although with the SNP at its 
core—was situated within a vibrant independence movement, and thus could rely 
on a broader coalition of grassroot groups which had a more decentralised 
structure, and inclusive and participatory values. This was a key factor on shaping 
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how Yes Scotland enacted the digital affordances of social media and their model 
of campaigning overall.  
We cannot generalise from a single case study, we. Nonetheless, our 
findings provide insights relevant not only to understanding of referenda campaigns 
but also contemporary electoral campaigns more generally, where the significance 
of the relation between official campaigns, the extended network of campaign 
actors and the use of digital tools continues to grow. Nowadays political parties—
even in hierarchical and centralized party systems such as the UK’s—need not only 
to deal with the challenges and opportunities of DCTs, but also increasingly must 
engage and coordinate with a range of grassroot groups—often digitally driven—
outside their organizational structures, practices and values. 
As our study shows, however, it is only by understanding the interplay 
between a number of actors and factors (i.e. financial and labour resources, 
strategy, organizational structures, values and repertoires of the official campaign 
and other groups, as well as context) and how this relates to their use of DCTs, that 
we can better understand to what extent, how and why campaigns are changing. 
Technology and specialised consultancy can be bought, but other factors are less 
controllable factors, and yet they play a crucial role on mediating how digital tools 
are used and how it affects campaign models. We need to continue to develop a 
better understanding of the interaction between these factors, especially outside the 
United States.   
Moreover, while our study is not focused on the normative citizenship 
issues, it raises relevant “democratic health” questions associated with different 
models of campaigning.  In an era where exclusionary populism has gone 
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mainstream, debates are moving beyond the anxieties of the “crises of 
participation” in which almost any engagement was welcomed after decades of 
declining voter turn-out and crumbling party memberships. The cultural values that 
underpin the differential use of technology by campaigns cannot be switched on 
and off at will. Moreover, how well do they work for different goals and contexts? 
It should not be assumed that the digital action repertoires of different kinds of 
groups can be automatically transferred across types of organisations or domains, 
nor that it would be democratically desirable if this was the case. Instead, we must 
consider what types of participation are being enabled and encouraged and for what 
ends, whether these types are equally apt for parties and government as they are for 
single issues and protest, and how they relate to the (often contested) norms of 
democratic citizenship. 
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Figure 1: Top 0.1% of Nodes by Betweenness Centrality (January-September 
2014) 
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Figure 2: Better Together and intermediate nodes: extracted (subset of 6 nodes) 
from out-bound ego network, original size: Nodes = 161, Edges =2014 
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Figure 3: Yes Scotland and intermediate nodes: extracted (subset of 9 nodes) from 
out-bound ego network; original size: Nodes = 288, Edges =8192 
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Figure 4: Yes Scotland and local Yes campaign groups: extracted (subset of 35 
nodes) from out-bound ego network; original size: Nodes= 288, Edges =8192 
 
 
                                                
1 We first want to thank our interviewees. We also want to thank Kate Dommett and 
Maggie Scammell; the University of Glasgow’s Comparative Politics Cluster; the 
participants of the workshop on Digital Media, Power and Democracy; the reviewers at 
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ICA were this paper was presented; and especially the journal’s reviewers whose 
comments greatly helped us to improve it.  
 
2 The data consisted of: a unique tweet identifier; date and time; account; and full text. For 
the network analysis, the direction of the interaction, i.e. who mentioned who, was 
preserved. However, loops (or self-referrals) were removed.  
3 As any other study using Twitter‘s API, the data Twitter provides is a sample of the total 
number of tweets. Studies have shown, however, that by covering long periods of time and 
using large data-sets, as in this study, the representativeness of the sample is enhanced, 
especially for network analysis (Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 2013).   
4
 #indyref was adopted by all sides in the referendum, including but not only by the official 
campaigns, as the main tag for those seeking messages on the topic of the independence 
referendum. 
5 In a network, nodes are a representation of entities and edges are a representation of the 
relationship between these entities. In our context, nodes represent twitter accounts and 
edges are interactions between accounts - retweets, mentions and replies. For visualisation 
purposes nodes are drawn as points and edges are drawn as lines between interacting 
accounts. 
 
6 Centrality, or how important a node is to a network, can be measured in various ways. In 
this analysis we use betweenness centrality, which measures the number of shortest paths 
in the network that pass through a node (for a more detailed discussion of these concepts 
see Brandes and Erlebach (2005)). In addition to constructing this network of interactions, 
we classified the nodes into a pro-Yes, pro-No, and neutral classification. This was done 
by manually coding the 600 most used hashtags in the dataset and then scoring the nodes in 
the network based on their usage of these hashtags. 
7
 These three types of Twitter affordances are not synonymous. However, we analysed 
them together because they all allow groups pursuing a common goal 
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(independence/maintaining the union) to interact and share content. Moreover, the 
organisations included in the network are part of the outbound networks of the official 
campaigns, so it is highly unlikely that hostile engagement is taking place.  
8 These networks visualisations were constructed using Gephi and the Fruchterman-
Reingold (1991) force-directed method. The edges in the graph are directional and 
therefore two-way activity between nodes will have two edges, from source to target, and 
from target to source. The thickness of the edges is weighted by the relative amount of 
traffic passing along that edge.  
9
 Although we present a subset of the network here, the number of connections is taken 
from the whole dataset so as not to distort the importance of a node at the subset level. 
10
 The nodes are coloured based on their level of outward activity, for the Pro-
independence nodes the spectrum is from red to blue: National Collective 
(@wearenational) have the most outward activity. For the Pro-union nodes gradients of red 
are used, the stronger the red the more outward activity (@UKtogether and 
@Scottishlabour display the most outward activity). 
11 The selection criteria were as follows: the accounts had to have a reciprocal relationship 
with the official campaign; and had to be local groups supporting Yes (this was based on 
the name of the accounts).  
12Using a number of private and public data-sources, Mosaic segments the population at 
the postcode level, classifying them according to demographics, lifestyles, consumer 
preferences and political opinions. Political parties use it to segment the electorate into 
types and tailor political messages accordingly. 
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